In the last few years, Latin America has been at the forefront of the expansion of legal rights for same-sex couples. This expansion of rights cannot be easily explained by descriptive representation and LGBT advocacy within national. As a first step in exploring the basis of public opinion on this policy issue, this paper seeks to explain sources of individual variation in support for same-sex marriage in Latin America and the Caribbean. Using AmericasBarometer survey data for 24 countries in 2010 and 2012, this paper examines the tensions between religiosity and democratic values, which can be in conflict on the issue of same-sex marriage. On the one hand, democratic values are associated with support for civil rights and liberties, which would include support for equality for homosexuals. On the other hand, religious leadership, particular of evangelical churches and the Catholic Church, has opposed the expansion of samesex marriage rights. The results of this analysis suggest that these democratic values are compromised when individuals attend religious services regularly.
Latin America is at the forefront of the expansion of sexual rights. Over the last decade, in what has been termed the region's 'gay rights revolution' (Encarnación 2011), several Latin American governments have introduced constitutional amendments that ban discrimination based on sexual orientation, enacted civil unions for same-sex couples, allowed gay marriage, and adopted some of the most progressive legislation on gender identity. These policy changes are noteworthy as they contrast sharply with the recent retrenchment of sexual rights in Africa and Eastern Europe. They also challenge long-held views on the region, which is frequently seen as being deeply Catholic and machista. Indeed, because gay rights generally symbolize political modernization, Latin America does not appear to be a propitious environment in which these rights would transpire given its perceived traditional political culture.
At first glance, the expansion of gay rights could be seen as resulting from a steady decrease of intolerance of homosexuality in the region over the last fifteen years.
1 However, despite changes in tolerance levels, opposition to the extension of these rights has been consistently strong. In the case of gay marriage, opposition to its enactment, led by the Catholic Church leadership (which continues to occupy a strong social, cultural and political presence in many countries of the region), has been implacable (Hillier 2011 , Vaggione 2011 , Díez Forthcoming, Bimbi 2010 , Ballina 2013 , Lozano 2013 . While Latin Americans may have become more tolerant, conservative social forces do not seem to have lost their social and political presence. Recent research on the politics of gay marriage in Latin America suggests that policy change has been mostly induced by the ability of activists to frame the debate in a manner that resonates with larger political processes: in countries in which gay marriage has been enacted (Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay), activists and their allies have framed the debate as one of democratic deepening (Díez forthcoming). Their arguments have logically clashed with those advanced by conservative actors, which have presented the issue as one of morality and that, based on religious precepts, equate sex with reproduction.
This research has shed light on how proponents and opponents of gay marriage frame their arguments and mobilize in an effort to convince citizens and policymakers of their cause. It has helped us understand how the debate over gay marriage has unfolded during political debates among social and political leaders, and how the tension between democracy and morality has played out among policy actors, activists, religious leaders and the media. However, we know little regarding views on gay marriage among the general population. Other than general polling in support levels of gay marriage that is carried when these debates gain force, we do not know how the tension between democratic and religious values over support for gay marriage plays out in society at large or how it breaks down among various demographic groups. If gay marriage is perceived as an issue of democratic deepening, one would expect that those Latin Americans who have stronger democratic values would be more supportive of gay marriage. Equally, those who possess higher levels of religiosity are expected to be less supportive of gay marriage. In this paper, we rely on extensive polling data from across Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to look into the tension between religiosity and democratic values as they come into conflict over the issue of gay marriage, and also at how this tension plays out among various result of sustained efforts made by gay and lesbian activists, and their allies, to press governments for the expansion of rights. Starting with early pushes to derogate legal provisions that prohibited same-sex relations, activists in several countries have mobilized effectively to conquer a variety of other rights, such as the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation, the adoption of civil unions, and, more recently, gay marriage. In terms of gay marriage, recent research reveals that one of the factors behind the adoption of gay marriage has been the strategic ability of gay and lesbian activists to frame their demands as an issue of democratic deepening and citizenship, which has resonated with larger national debates around democratic consolidation (Schulenberg 2012, Díez forthcoming) . In some countries, discussions regarding human rights have been at the core of national debates and democratization has, at least discursively, largely been equated with greater respect for human rights. As a result, gay and lesbian activists have been able align their demands with broader debates and conceptions regarding democracy. Because democratization in many countries of the region has involved a wide social contestation over the meaning of democracy and given the salience human rights have gained in post-transition debates, there has been greater social and political receptiveness to demands made by advocacy groups. Likewise, activists have relied on such receptiveness to convince policymakers to support their cause. The region's democratic golden age appears thus to have been conducive to the expansion of gay marriage in some countries.
The apparent propitious conditions for the expansion of rights notwithstanding, religion, and conservative values associated with the most prominent denominations in Latin America, continues to be a significant social force. Contrary to the expectations of early iterations of modernization theory (e.g., Lipset 1959), economic development in Latin America has not brought about a secularization of society. While it is difficult to establish longer-term trends on levels of religiosity in the region due to the lack of data, a rather starkly significant number of Latin Americans express religious beliefs. In 2012, 95% of those in Latin America and the Carribbean self-identified as Catholic, a Protestant or Evangelical denomination,or a nonreligious believer. Nearly 60% of Latin Americans reported that religion was "very" important and an additional 26% said it was rather important in their life. In 2013, 'the Catholic Church' as an institution inspired the confidence of more than 60% of Latin Americans, more than any other private or political institution (LAPOP 2012) . Nearly 50% of Latin Americans express trust in the Evangelical or Protestant Church, which is notable (LAPOP 2012) . In comparative terms, this means that Latin Americans tend to emphasize traditional and religious social values more strongly than most other societies, except for Islamic ones (Inglehart 2009 ). Religiosity appears to be alive and well, as is the social presence and, often, political influence of religious leaders. To be sure, the Roman Catholic Church has lost its historic social and political dominant position in continental Latin America. While this is partly due to a decline in religious observance and self-identification among Catholics, it is also as a result of increased religious competition, especially from Protestant denominations. In particular, over the last twenty years a significant number of Latin Americans have decided to abandon the Catholic Church and joined competing denominations (Hagopian 2009 ). In effect, the percentage of Latin Americans that proclaim to belong to evangelical and Pentecostal churches has steadily increased (Hagopian 2009) , and in 2012, over 20% of Latin Americans self-identified as members of Evangelical Protestant, Jehovah's Witness, or the Church of Latter-Day Saints (Mormon) denominations (LAPOP 2012) . Religiosity, along increased religious pluralism, appears thus to be well entrenched in the region.
Nonetheless, the religious pluralism that has followed the Catholic Church's decline does not mean a decrease in religious presence in the political sphere, and conservative religious leaders continue to play a prominent role in social policy debates, especially those regarding moral politics. On the one hand, the Catholic Church leadership has not lost its social presence and continues to use its pulpit to engage in national debates (Htun 2009 ). On the other, the growing socially conservative groups, affiliated with evangelical and protestant churches, have established relationships with international movements, many of them based in the US, and have become active in moral policy debates in efforts to reverse an alleged decline in moral values. Religious conservative leaders have been very vocal during national debates over moral policy reform. In the case of gay marriage, they have responded very strongly to efforts to expand the right to marry to same-sex couples. The Catholic Church leadership and leaders who belong to conservative evangelical groups have mobilized followers and have applied pressure on policymakers not to allow for gay marriage. Their opposition has been framed based on historically dominant natural-law conceptions of the family and sexuality which equate sex with reproduction. According to this view, homosexual activities are considered to be a sin and therefore, immoral (Hiller 2010 , Schulenberg 2012 .
A paradox should be obvious: Latin Americans exhibit comparatively high levels of postmaterial values yet they also exhibit high levels of traditional religious values. According to Inglehart, this makes Latin American societies have a distinctive character in a global perspective because "they emphasize traditional religious values more strongly than most other cultural zones, while also emphasizing the self-expression values linked with post-industrial societies far more strongly than other societies at comparable levels of economic development" (2009, 94) . This apparent paradox creates therefore a tension in discussions over moral policy, as in the case of gay marriage. Because proponents and supporters have framed gay marriage as an issue of human rights, tolerance and democracy (i.e., post-industrial values), it collides with of religious leaders' view of the policy as an issue of morality (i.e., traditional religious values). However, while we know how this debate has unfolded among social and political leaders, we do not know how the tension between democracy and religiosity plays out among Latin American populations. References to 'cultural zones' are evidently problematic for the societies that compose them are highly diverse. For example, while Latin Americans may possess high levels of religiosity, it is a region characterized by religious pluralism and levels of conservatism vary across denominations. Opposition to gay marriage cannot therefore be expected to be the same across all religious individuals. In the case of Argentina, gay marriage was in fact supported by some religious leaders. In the sections that follow we explore this very tension.
Support for Same-Sex Marriage: The Empirical Evidence
In order to answer our guiding research question -how the tension between democratic and religious values over support for gay marriage plays out in Latin American societies -we use public opinion surveys (AmericasBarometer) conducted in 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries 2010 and 2012 (Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) n.d.). 4 We look at individuals' responses to support for gay marriage. The dependent variable is survey respondents' expressed approval on a ten-point scale for the right of homosexuals to be married (casarse in Spanish), where one represents "strongly disapprove" and ten represents "strongly approve." 5 We use linear regression to test our main hypothesis: that support for gay marriage is higher among those who hold more strongly democratic values and lower among those who exhibit higher levels of religiosity. 6 We include controls for individuals' demographic characteristics and socioeconomic status, as shown in Table 1 . th and 95 th percentiles include one through ten. 6 In this analysis, respondents are nested within different national samples in 2010 and 2012. This data structure creates the possibility that errors do not have uniform variance or are serially correlated within national samples and over time. The latter might occur if the individual-level model fails to include a predictor that is important or relevant in a particular country, resulting in serially correlated errors within a particular country-year. Given these concerns, our analytical strategy involves including fixed effects for each country-year, which estimates a countryyear specific intercept. Unless otherwise noted, the analyses below also include LAPOP-provided probability weights and robust standard errors. Estimating the main models with random coefficients for the main theoretical variables and the full set of country-year indicators does not change the statistical or substantive findings. For simplicity of presentation, linear regression results are used in all tables and figures. See the online appendix for full tables of results. Support for democracy is measured using responses to a question asking whether respondents agree that even though it can have problems, democracy is the best form of government (on a seven point scale). This question is a standard way to measure respondents' commitment to democracy and has been found to be highly correlated with measures of democratic values (Córdova and Seligson 2010) . To verify consistent results, we also used a different question that asked respondents to choose which of three statements they most agreed: it does not matter whether government is democratic or not; an authoritarian government may be preferable in some circumstances; or democracy is preferable to any other form of government. Respondents who chose the democratic option were coded as democratic supporters (a dichotomous variable). We expect those who express support for democracy to be more likely to support same-sex marriage. Religiosity is measured using respondents' reported frequency of attending religious services on a scale that ranges from one for never or seldom, three for about once a month, to five for more than once a week. 7 We hypothesize that interaction with religious leaders and doctrine rather than private religious practices is particularly important for influencing attitudes on same-sex marriage. Previous research suggests that it is participation in religious communities, rather than religious identity alone, that is particularly relevant for shaping opposition to same-sex rights such as marriage (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006, 346; Sherkat et al. 2011, 174) .We expect those who are more religious to be less supportive of the right to same-sex marriage.
To evaluate the interactive effect between support for democracy and religiosity, we include an interaction term that allows us to measure the effect of religiosity at different levels of expressed support for democracy. Figure 1 depicts this interactive effect by graphing the predicted changes in support for same-sex marriage as religiosity increases for both those that express strong agreement that democracy is best and strong disagreement that democracy is best.
8 This figure illustrates the negative effect that religiosity appears to have on support for same-sex marriage. Overall, we see that religiosity has a negative effect on support for gay marriage among both democrats and non-democrats. Controlling for a variety of factors, the highly religious (identified as those who attend services more than once a week) express significantly less support for same-sex marriage than the non-religious (those that rarely attend services) for both those who strongly agree and strongly disagree that democracy is the best form of government. Among those respondents who strongly disagree that democracy is the best form of government, the difference in support between non-religious and highly religious can be as little as two percent of the ten-point scale of support for same-sex marriage. In other words, among non-democrats, religiosity has an effect, but it is rather small. However, among strong democrats, religiosity has a strikingly sharp negative effect on support for same-sex marriage. The difference between the non-religious and highly religious can be more than ten percent of the ten-point scale. This implies that those who are non-democrats are not influenced as much by religion, whereas among democrats, religion appears to affect them heavily.
This finding suggests that while some Latin Americans may support in principle the idea of democracy, religion erodes such support when it is brought into focus on what some have framed as being a democratic right. For these individuals, democracy as an idea does not 7 The results are consistent and even more dramatic using subjective indicators and are presented in the online appendix. 8 A similar figure using the alternative dichotomous measure of support for democracy illustrates a similar result and is included in the online appendix, with results for the full model. guarantee support for this particular right. Our main finding speaks to the tension that exists between democratic values and moral values among Latin Americans that we have described. It also suggests that those who support democracy or have stronger democratic values and attend religious services appear to be more receptive to the Church's conservative message -which has presented its opposition to gay marriage based on moral principles -than those who are less democratically minded. The tension is highlighted in the figure. For non-democrats, there is no tension because they do not support democracy, irrespective of whether they support gay marriage or the frequency of their religious service attendance. The tension plays out among those who at potentially support democracy. For them, there is a trade off in competing visions and the message that same-sex marriage is immoral appears to win them over their exposure to it increases. These individuals appear to be unable to reconcile both positions. Note: Predicted effects based on OLS estimates and 95% confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors for a model including all control variables described in the text, a country-year probability weight, and a full set of country-year fixed effects. Full model results included in the online appendix.
Given the important role of religiosity, it is reasonable to ponder the extent to which support for same-sex marriage can be explained by Catholicism, the majority religious identity of all major religions and non-believers combined in all but six of the 24 countries in the analysis.
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As mentioned, the Catholic Church leadership has advanced a consistently oppositional position to gay marriage based on its uncompromising doctrine regarding homosexuality. Meanwhile, as also mentioned, religious pluralism has grown in the region, and positions on gay marriage vary across denominations. In the analysis, we include a set of indicators for type of religious beliefs to capture differences among different types of religious identities. The reference category includes those who do not believe in God, or atheists. Additional indicators are included for each of Catholics, Protestants, or non-religious believers. Respondents who self-identified as evangelical Christians, Church of Latter Day Saints (Mormons), or Jehovah's Witnesses were all coded as one category given similar stances on the issue of same-sex marriage and similar levels of support across these three religious identities in the sample. Finally, a handful of very small (less than 5% of the population) religious minorities, such as Jewish, Muslim, Eastern, and syncretic African religions, are coded as one category. Assuming that religious individuals are influenced by their respective religious leaders, and knowing that opposition to gay marriage is stronger among certain denominations, we expect that those who self-identify as Catholic, Protestant, and evangelical, or other Christian practicing believers, will express the least support for same-sex marriage. This is consistent with research support on gay marriage and religion elsewhere ( Figure 2 plots the average difference in support for same-sex marriage by type of religious identity predicted by the full regression model that includes the interactive effect between religiosity and support for democracy. Overall, religious identities significantly vary in the average support for same-sex marriage in Latin America, which is consistent with similar findings in the aforementioned research and recent polling elsewhere (Pew Research Center 2013). In particular, evangelical Christians, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and mainline Protestants all express significantly lower support for same-sex marriage than any other religious identities. On average, controlling for other factors, those with these religious identities express approximately one-point (or ten percent of the ten-point scale) less support for same-sex marriage than non-believers. Catholics and non-religious believers (many of whom are likely to have been raised in Catholic households or attended Catholic schools, at least in Spanishspeaking Latin America) share similar levels of support for same-sex marriage, but significantly more support (about five percent of the ten-point scale) than other Christians and significantly less support (also about five percent) than non-believers.
10
10 In a separate analysis, the interaction between religiosity and democratic values was also interacted with Catholic/all non-Catholics to determine whether the main findings were being driven primarily by this relationship among Catholics. The results of that analysis (which otherwise included the same specification as the main models) indicates that that the primary interaction effect is evident across both non-Catholics and Catholics, though among non-Catholics, religiosity has a more consistently negative effect on support for same-sex marriage than among Catholics. A figure of the primary result is included in the online appendix. Exploring democratic values and support for same-sex marriage Thus far, the two measures we have used to measure support for democracy are those most frequently used to assess popular commitments to democracy in the region. However, they provide little insight into an individual's more substantive commitment to democratic governance. Individuals may support in the abstract the idea of democracy, especially when compared to authoritarianism, or other forms of government, but they may not be supportive of some of the elements that actually underpin democratic rule. The distinction between procedural versus more substantive understandings of democracy has a long lineage in political theory going back to the writings of Alexi de Toqueville. In essence, the argument has been that democratic governance requires the internalization of democratic values (Neubauer 1967 , Dahl 1971 , Gibson 1995 , O'Donnell 1996 . Here, we are interested in identifying individuals, committed democrats, who conceive of democracy as being more than elections, and who express support for elements often associated with democratic governance. Two of these elements are tolerance and participation, which have been used by scholars to gauge the internalization of democratic values (Marcus et al 1995 , Gibson 1992 . Committed democrats are likely to express higher support for self-expression values, which includes diversity and tolerance of minorities, including gay rights. These are individuals who are more likely to agree with the position that gay marriage is linked to democracy, as framed by supporters. We identify committed democrats by using a question that asks respondents the extent to which they agree that executives need to limit the voice and vote of opposition parties for progress of the country. Those that express disagreement are coded as choosing a democratic response. We also use a question that asks whether the country lacks a government with a strong hand or that problems can be resolved with the participation of all, and code those that support participation as democrats. The responses to these two questions are combined to measure democratic values. This measure ranges from one (those with nondemocratic answers to both questions) to three (those with democratic answers to both questions), with an intermediate category for those who chose a non-democratic answer to either question. 11 We expect that those that value democratic participation and are more tolerant to opposing views (committed democrats) will be more likely to support same-sex marriage because they have internalized these values and perceive democracy in a more substantive way.
As with the measures for support for democracy, democratic values, including preferences inclusive participation and for opposition political actors, are in general associated with higher levels of support for same-sex marriage, particularly among those who attend religious services less than monthly (see Figure 3) . These findings are consistent with what is expected and reflect the overall tension between democratic and religious values. We also find that religiosity has little impact on the support for same-sex marriage among those who are the least democratically committed. This is consistent with the findings above. Furthermore, attendance of religious services has quite a significant impact, among committed democrats, on levels of support for gay marriage. The findings are in line with those above, but would seem more striking because they suggest that, even among those who have are expected to have internalized democratic values and who perceive democracy in more substantive ways, religion also has an eroding effect, which affects their support for gay marriage. Committed democrats seem to be susceptible to the idea that gay marriage is an issue of morality, trumping some of values that underpin democratic governance. The tension between democratic and religious values is clear.
Figure 3: Predicted effect of democratic values and religiosity on support for same-sex marriage
Note: Predicted effects based on OLS estimates and 95% confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors for a model including all control variables described in the text, a country-year probability weight, and a full set of country-year fixed effects. Full model results included in the online appendix.
We also construct an index of political tolerance combining four questions that ask respondents whether those that are critical of the government should be allowed to vote, participate in a peaceful protest, give a speech on television or run for public office. 12 The index ranges from zero to one. We expect that those who are more politically tolerant will be more likely to support same-sex marriage because, by definition, tolerance reflects individuals' disposition to accept social diversity (Marcus et al 1995) . According to Inglehart, and others, political tolerance, as a self-expression value, is central to democracy (2005) . At the same time, religiosity challenges political tolerance because of the rigid positions that some religions have on a variety of social issues. This is, of course, the case on several religions' uncompromising positions regarding the morality of homosexuality. Figure 4 illustrates the effect of political tolerance and religiosity on support for same-sex marriage. These results, too, are highly 12 Each question asks respondent agreement with allowing various forms of political expression and influence for those critical of the government on a 10-point scale. The responses to these four questions are summed and then divided by the largest sum possible to create a variable that ranges from zero to one. The online appendix includes the full model results and results for models using the individual political tolerance indicators included in the index.. consistent with earlier results. Political tolerance is associated with significantly higher levels of support for same-sex marriage than those who are not politically tolerant. This difference is even more pronounced than for the other types of democratic values or general support for democratic institutions, which suggests that political tolerance is more important for shaping attitudes toward the right to same-sex marriage than participatory values or support for democratic rule in abstract terms. . The gap in support between non-tolerant and tolerant individuals is significantly greater the less religious the individual as well. Note: Predicted effects based on OLS estimates and 95% confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors for a model including all control variables described in the text, a country-year probability weight, and a full set of country-year fixed effects. Full model results included in the online appendix.
A pattern clearly emerges from our findings thus far. There exists a relationship between religiosity and support for gay marriage, which reflects the tension that exists between democratic and religious values. Irrespective of which measurement we use to gauge support for democracy and democratic values (support for democratic rule, democratic values, or political tolerance), religiosity (and the expected exposure of totalizing views on moral issues), has an eroding effect. The more people attend religious services, the more they are likely to trade off their democratic values for moral religious ones. The tension between democratic and religious values, which are clearly apparent in Latin America, is therefore underscored with regard to the issue of gay marriage.
Exploring demographic and socioeconomic variations As mentioned, the analysis includes several control variables for additional individual characteristics that are known to shape attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Not only might these demographic or socioeconomic characteristics be related to particular levels of support for the right to same-sex marriage, but the relationships between support for democracy and religiosity may be weaker or stronger among some subgroups of Latin Americans. Figure 5 plots the effects of each other covariate (with 95% confidence intervals) included in the main model estimated to explain support for same-sex marriage. Nearly all of the results are consistent with expectations and statistically significant. For example, people who live in larger urban areas are more likely to support the expansion of gay rights because they are more likely, due to sheer density, to have met someone who is gay and change their attitudes (Wilcox and Norrander 2002) . This is supported by contact theory, which suggests that individuals who come into contact with others who possess dissimilar (ethnic, sexual, etc.) characteristics are more likely to be less prejudiced toward them (Stephan and McMullin 1982 , Pettigrew 1998 , Becker 2012 . Recent data from the United States confirms the contact theory in relation to support for gay marriage. For example, in 2013, 34% of those (polled) who have changed their minds in support for gay marriage said they did so because they met someone who is gay (Pew Research Center 2013). In our analysis, those who live in the national capital city in each country express nearly four percent higher levels of support for same-sex marriage. These results are predicted by social contact theory. Note: OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors for a model including all control variables described in the text, a country-year probability weight, and a full set of country-year fixed effects. Additional results presented in Figures 1 and 2 . Full model results included in the online appendix.
Nevertheless, the tensions between democratic support and religiosity are likely to be experienced differently by those who live in the largest cities and those in provincial cities and rural areas. In particular, one would expect, based on social contact theory, that democrats who live in the largest cities would be less susceptible to being influenced by traditional religious positions on gay marriage. That is, because they are more likely to have come into contact with someone who is gay, they would be expected to reconcile their support for democracy with conflicting positions on homosexuality and gay marriage emanating from religious activities. To test this proposition, we include three-way interaction terms among capital, agreement that democracy is the best form of government and religiosity. The primary results of these relationships are presented in Figure 6 . As expected, average support for same-sex marriage is overall much higher in capital cities than elsewhere. Religious attendance affects both groups. However, compared to other parts of the country, in capital cities religiosity has a much more pronounced effect on attitudes toward same-sex marriage for both those that are strong democrats and those who are not. At the same time, non-democrats in capital cities are more likely to oppose same-sex marriage the more religious they are, though the estimates has relatively wide confidence intervals due to smaller numbers of non-democrats in capital cities. Elsewhere, religiosity has no effect on support for same-sex marriage among non-democrats.
Democrats both in capital cities and elsewhere are less likely to support same-sex marriage as their religiosity increases. What is noteworthy is that religious attendance appears to have a stronger effect on democrats who live in capital cities that on those who do not. This finding underlines the rather strong influence church attendance has on democrats, especially those living in capital cities. It suggests that moral arguments trump democratic values, especially among those who are more likely to have come in contact with someone who is gay. In other words, a democrat who lives in a capital city and who is more likely to have met someone gay is less able to reconcile the tension between democratic values and traditional religious values the more frequently she goes to church. It also suggests that conservative values are more dominant in the public space outside capital cities.
Figure 6: Support for democracy, religiosity, and same-sex marriage by locality
Other demographic characteristics, such as gender and age, are also usually associated with particular attitudes toward same-sex marriage. For example, women are expected to be more supportive of same-sex marriage because they are more likely to empathize with discrimination and homosexuality threatens less their social status (Wilkinson 2006 ). In our sample, women express about six percent higher levels of support for same-sex marriage than men, as expected (see Figures 5 and 7) . Like the results for capital cities, religion has a strong effect on those individuals that are otherwise more likely to support gay marriage. Specifically, women's support for same-sex marriage significantly decreases the more regularly they attend church services. This is particularly true among women who express the highest levels of support for democracy. These results suggest that religiosity seems to erase gender differences among democrats, and that religion has a limited effect among non-democrats. The most robust results regarding the relationship between democratic and religious values are the ones regarding the group that is generally predicted to support gay marriage the most: democratic women. For this group, exposure to arguments based on moral principles, expected to be higher the more they go to church services, erodes their support for gay marriage more (and very) significantly.
Figure 7: Support for democracy, religiosity, and same-sex marriage by gender
We similarly explore the variations in the interaction between support for democracy and religiosity for different generations. Generational differences are captured using a set of indicators for respondents under 30 (reference category), 31 through 45, 46 through 60, and over 60 years old. 13 The original results indicate that as age increases, support for same-sex marriage significantly decreases (see Figure 5 ). This is most dramatic for those over 60, whose support for same-sex marriage is on average 5% lower than that of those under 30. This is not surprising given that age is the most important predictor for gay-marriage support elsewhere, such as in the United States (Brewer 2003a , Becker 2006 , Becker and Scheufele 2011 , Pew Research Center 2013 , Baunach 2012 . Similar research does not exist for Latin America, but one would expect generational differences would apply similarly.
We explore the relationship between support for democracy, religiosity and same-sex marriage by generation (see Figure 8) .
14 This extension of the analysis highlights several additional features of the generational differences in support for same-sex marriage. These findings suggest that, as would be expected, younger generations are more supportive of gay marriage, which is consistent with research outside Latin America. It is also evident that, across all age groups, attending religious services has a negative effect on democrats' support for samesex marriage. While the effect on those who are 60 or older is less pronounced, the more people attend religious services, the more they are likely to be convinced by conservative positions regarding gay marriage. These findings show some unexpected relationships, particularly among the non-democratic middle-aged subgroup. It is the first time that we see a non-democratic sector of the population support gay marriage more the more frequent they attend religious services. It is an interesting puzzle and one that warrants further inquiry. These are individuals who been exposed the most to processes of democratization, and so perhaps, while they do not support democracy, they are willing to support some rights in light of past human rights abuses. It is, of course, difficult to say unless questions probing these relations are asked in questionnaires.
The most striking relationship in Figure 8 appears to revolve around the tension that exists between democratic and religious values in the younger generations. Even though those under 30 express the highest levels of support for same-sex marriage of any generation, religiosity also has a very significant negative effect on that support that is consistent among both non-democrats and democrats alike. The impact that religion has on young democrats is indeed remarkable, for it means that the subgroup that supports gay marriage the most is highly susceptible to traditional religious views on marriage. Again, and consistent with what we have thus far found, among sectors of Latin American societies that are the most supportive of gay marriage (women, those who live in capital cities and youth), church attendance has a significant eroding effect on their support. Among those over 60, religiosity also has a significantly negative impact on support for same-sex marriage among both non-democrats and democrats. However, among this older generation, non-democrats actually tend to express higher levels of support for same-sex marriage.
Figure 8: Support for democracy, religiosity, and same-sex marriage by generation
Finally, we also explore the tension between democratic and religious values according to level of education. Education has been widely identified by the literature as having a significant effect on support for gay marriage (Becker 2006 , Becker and Scheufele 2011 , Pew Research Center 2013 , Baunach 2012 , Craig et al 2005 . We therefore expect education to be associated with more supportive attitudes toward same-sex marriage. We measure education by using a set of indicators for those with no formal education through completed primary education (reference category), those with some and completed secondary education, and those with any postsecondary education. As expected, we find a clear relationship between education levels and support for gay marriage in Latin America; the higher the education, the more supportive Latin Americans are of gay marriage (see Figure 5) . Meanwhile, attending religious services has a negative effect on support for gay marriage among those with higher levels of education (see Figure 9) . A puzzling finding relates to non-democrats with minimal or no education. They tend to be more supportive of gay marriage the more frequent they attend religious services. This is similar to our finding above among middle-aged non-democrats. This phenomenon calls for further investigation. Similarly to all the various subgroups that we have analyzed, the most striking family is the impact that participation in religious services has the subgroup that is more expected to support gay marriage the strongest: educated democrats. Out of the three subgroups, religious attendance has the strongest eroding effect on them.
Figure 9: Support for democracy, religiosity, and same-sex marriage by education
Residual cross-national and temporal variation in support for same-sex marriage In all models discussed so far, the overall fit is quite good (adjusted r 2 ≅ 0.24), particularly compared to similar cross-national studies of public opinion. While we have focused on variations in the factors influencing individuals' support for same-sex marriage, we should also note that significant cross-national variation in support for the right to same-sex marriage persists throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Figure 10 illustrates the predicted average support for same-sex marriage based on the full model used to examine the relationship between support for democracy and religiosity. It is not surprising that support for same-sex marriage is highest in the most developed countries in the region, which is consistent with earlier cross-national research (Anderson and Fetner 2008) . Likewise, support for same-sex marriage is significantly lower in former British colonies, which likely reflects the legacy of common law prohibitions of sodomy (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013, 325-6) . Note: Country-year fixed effects with 95% confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors for a model including all control variables described in the text and a country-year probability weight. Additional results presented in Figures 1, 2 , and 5. Full model results included in the online appendix.
In addition, the figure highlights the stability of attitudes toward same-sex marriage in most countries between 2010 and 2012, with a handful of notable exceptions. In Uruguay, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile, public support is both relatively high and significantly increased. Though we cannot say for certain whether the policy changes in these countries are the cause or the effect of these shifts in public opinion, it is clear there has been notable change in these countries where this issue has been on the national agenda. There have also been significant positive shifts in support for same-sex marriage in Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua in the last few years. Despite this progress, significant gaps in rights diminish the equality of homosexuals in much of the region, and there is some evidence of a backlash as well (Encarnación 2011, 115-7) . For example, in Belize, Honduras, Peru, and Panama, public opposition to same-sex marriage has significantly increased in a short time. Though explaining these cross-national and temporal variations are beyond the scope of our analysis, they suggest the region is home to diverse attitudes and dynamic changes that beg further analysis.
Conclusions
Our analysis is the first of its kind to explore the ways in which the competing frames used by LBGT activists and religious elites around the gay marriage debate translate into individuals' attitudes in Latin America. This research confirms that those who embrace democracy and democratic values, including participation and political tolerance, express greater support for same-sex marriage. However, when those with strong commitments to democratic values also participate weekly or more frequently in religious communities by attending religious services, they instead express much lower levels of support for the right to marriage for same-sex couples. This suggests that highly religious democrats are perhaps more receptive to the argument from religious elites that frames the issue of same-sex marriage as one about traditional family and morality and do not consider that argument inconsistent with democratic principles of political tolerance. Indeed, such individuals may value democracy for the protection it implies for their religious beliefs and traditional family values. Conversely, those who are more skeptical of democracy and less politically tolerant, not only express, on average, less support for same-sex marriage but their attitudes are not likely to be greatly influenced by regular church attendance.
Though this tension between democratic values and religiosity is repeated across various demographic and socioeconomic groups in Latin America, the dynamic varies in some predictable and interesting ways. For instance, for men, those living in the largest cities, those under 30, and those with more education religiosity seems to have similar pronounced negative effects support for same-sex marriage for both non-democrats and democrats. However, the effect of church attendance on attitudes differs for those with weak and strong democratic values outside capital cities, among women, and those between 30 and 60 years old or with minimal formal education. When these individuals are also weak democrats, they tend to be less supportive of same-sex marriage, and that attitude is often not significantly affected by attending religious services frequently. In contrast, those with the strongest democratic values who are less religious express much higher support for same-sex marriage than those who attend religious services very frequently. These individuals (e.g., women, those who came of age during democratic transitions, or those with minimal education) have perhaps more complex personal experiences related to sexual rights, democratic values, and religious beliefs. These are possibilities that invite future research.
Our findings about the micro-foundations of attitudes toward same-sex marriage in Latin America have implications for both the political debates and future studies on this issue in both Latin America and elsewhere. In particular, we have shown that individual-level beliefs about democratic values and religiosity shape attitudes toward same-sex marriage. This makes sense given the framing of the same-sex marriage debate by religious elites and activist movements and their allies throughout the region. However, democratic values and religiosity can and do conflict, and the ways in which they conflict may vary among different demographic or socioeconomic groups. This suggests that activists may need to adjust their framing differently to attract the support of some potential allies who otherwise are less responsive to the human rights justifications for the right of same-sex couples to marry.
On the one hand, our research provides additional evidence for some known correlates of support for same-sex marriage that are known to matter in the United States, Canada, and Europe. For example, many of our findings for the role of gender, locality size, age, education, and political ideology are highly consistent with other cross-national and national studies. On the other hand, our analysis focuses on how public opinion may be shaped by the specific strategies used by political actors to influence policy debates in Latin America, where the role of the Catholic Church and history of authoritarianism distinguish the region from most advanced industrialized democracies and other developing countries. This implies that political, social, and historical context matters, and future work should not only aim at generalizing across individual characteristics but also understanding how national or regional debates influence individuals' opinions as well.
ONLINE APPENDIX
Model 1 includes all the variables described in the text, and Model 2 also includes an interaction between support for democracy and religiosity. In text Figures 1, 2 , 5, and 10 are based on the Democracy is best version of Model 2's OLS point estimates with robust standard errors, including country-year probability weights and a full set of fixed effects indicators for each country-year. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include a full set of country x survey year fixed effects and country-year specific probability weights. See Figure 10 for the fixed country-year effects. Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between the dichotomous measure of support for democracy (democracy is preferable) and religiosity based on the results in Table 1 , Model 2.
Figure 1: Religiosity and support for democracy (alternative dichotomous indicator)
Note: OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors for a model including all control variables described in the text, a country-year probability weight, and a full set of country-year fixed effects.
In order to test the robustness of the principle finding, we also estimate the models using a subjective measure of religiosity. This measure is based on a question that asks respondents how important religion is in their life. The answers range from "not at all" (1) to "very" (4). Table 3 includes the full results using this alternative indicator for religiosity combined with the primary indicator for democratic support. The effects are consistent with (and even a bit stronger than) those in the main text. Because subjective self-reporting of religiosity may be more susceptible to social desirability bias, we prefer the more conservative measure based on frequency of attendance at religious services. In nearly all countries, a majority of respondents self-identify with one of the main Christian religions. Overall, less than five percent self-identify as other religions. The balance of respondents self-identify either as non-religious believers or non-believers. Table 4 summarizes the main self-reported religious identities in the sample. Sorted by descending total proportion of sample that self-identifies as one of three main religious identities in 2012.
Because in most countries Catholicism is the predominant religious identity (see Table 3 ), we examined whether Catholic responders were responsible for the primary finding regarding the interaction between support for democracy and religiosity. To do so, we introduced an interaction between Catholic, support for democracy, and religiosity. The primary result is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Figure 2: Religiosity and democratic values by Catholic religious identity
As described in the text, we extended our analysis beyond simple support for democracy to consider the effect of expressing democratic values, particularly those of inclusive participation and political tolerance on support for same-sex marriage. Table 5 includes the full results of this analysis, which also is used to generate Figures 3 and 4 in the text. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include a full set of country x survey year fixed effects and country-year specific probability weights.
While Table 5 includes the results for an index of political tolerance based on four different questions, Table 6 presents the same models using each of the four measures separately. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include a full set of country x survey year fixed effects and country-year specific probability weights.
In order to examine the ways in which the primary relationship between support for democracy and religiosity impact support for same-sex marriage, we estimated a series of models that included three-way interactions between those variables and demographic characteristics, such as gender or age. In the text, these results are discussed in relation to Figures 6-9, and Table 7 includes the estimates of the variables included in the interactions. Though all the models include all the other covariates in the other full models, the results for those variables and the fixed country-year effects are consistent with the estimates in the other models and so are omitted. 
